Permitting medical device makers to modify an existing device based on bench testing is allowed by regulations and is not an unsafe approach, wrote CDRH director Daniel Schultz in a recent letter to the New England Journal of Medicine.
Schultz took issue with the March 6 article written by William Maisel that criticized FDA’s handling of adverse events related to the recall of Medtronic’s Sprint Fidelis implantable cardioverter-defibrillator leads. Maisel is the director of the Medical Device Safety Institute at the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (Boston).
“In evaluating an application involving a modified device, we analyze the proposed modification, determine the potential types of failure, and tailor testing requirements accordingly,†Schultz wrote. “In many cases, our questions are best answered by performing appropriate engineering analyses, but in other cases, we also require clinical data…To require that these modified devices undergo clinical trials across the board as a condition of FDA approval would limit the availability of improved products. Also, most of these trials would have insufficient power to detect small but clinically meaningful differences in performance.â€
Maisel’s article criticized FDA and Medtronic over the Fidelis recall. After concerns arose about Fidelis’s performance, he said, Medtronic notified doctors of a “limited number†of devices that had a higher-than-expected lead fracture rate. The company said Fidelis’s performance was “in line with other Medtronic leads†and cited a small prospective postmarketing study that found a 1.1% lead failure rate within two years of implantation.
Maisel said the company didn’t report that the study was “grossly underpowered to detect even a moderate increase in fracture rate in the Fidelis as compared with its predecessors. In short, despite implantation of the device in hundreds of thousands of patients during several years on the market, the available postmarketing data were insufficient to provide a definitive conclusion about whether there was a performance problem.â€
Even as Medtronic maintained that the lead functioned within acceptable parameters, Maisel said, the company submitted an application to FDA in May 2007 for design and manufacturing changes and received approval two months later.
But already-manufactured leads remained available and continued to be used. By the following October, Medtronic had confirmed 665 fractures in returned leads, five deaths, and a 2.3% fracture rate within 30 months of implantation, and recalled the product.
Schultz’s letter answered that there is “nothing inherently wrong†with allowing a device maker to continue to market existing models while modified (and presumably improved) models await FDA approval, unless the older models pose an undue health risk.
“The continued marketing of Fidelis leads occurred when available data indicated that the fracture rate was similar to that of other leads,†he said. “When continued monitoring of the situation showed otherwise, the lead was recalled and existing stocks were promptly called back.â€
Schultz complained that Maisel’s article “diverts attention from deeper problems. For example, how can bench testing be better designed to be predictive of clinical performance? How can postmarketing clinical registries be used more effectively as early warning systems, alerting us to low-frequency, unexpected problems with devices?†he asked.
Also, Schultz said, “Given that we cannot detect low-rate events without a steady flow of accurate information, how can physicians be persuaded to report adverse events to us promptly? We welcome thoughtful input on these issues from clinicians, patients, and the medical device industry.â€
– James G. Dickinson