BEYOND CLINICAL DIAGNOSTICS
![]() |
The government, military, and private sectors in the United States have invested significantly into developing and implementing biowarfare-monitoring systems (e.g., the Laboratory Response Network and BioWatch). But such systems have come at the expense of lax food and environmental safety monitoring. The public has certainly been affected by the frequency and severity of the daily impact of food- and waterborne pathogens.
For example, in 2007, salmonella detected in spinach and peanut butter, and botulinum in chili and pet food led to significant recalls. Recently, E. coli fears prompted the recall of more than 21 million pounds of ground beef (the second-largest in U.S. history) and forced a meat company to close after 67 years in business. A 2006 recall involved spinach tainted with E. coli that killed three people and infected 200. CDC estimates that approximately 76 million cases of foodborne illnesses occur each year in the United States.1 In addition, upwards of 2 million people become ill each year as a result of drinking contaminated water.2
Despite the myriad of technologies for food and water safety monitoring and pathogen detection, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington, DC) and FDA (Rockville, MD) have used them haphazardly.3,4 While recent incidents have garnered the public’s desire for increased surveillance of the food supply, one lingering perception in the food industry has been that consumers should address many safety issues with proper handling techniques. This perception has reaffirmed the decisions by government entities to limit developing food and water surveillance technologies, and focus greater attention and resources on monitoring aerosol biothreats. Indeed, the release of bioterrorism agents as aerosols not only poses a tremendous risk to the entire population but also could overwhelm the ability of local, state, and federal agencies to respond. Such risks underscore further the need for rapid and efficient pathogen detection and identification systems.
This article discusses recent advances in developing comprehensive monitoring systems that can detect in real time and identify conclusively a biothreat from a broad range of pathogens and toxins. Such advances have been addressing the need to monitor and protect public health and safety from an ever-growing list of homeland security biothreats.
Existing Technologies
Although a multitude of technologies are available to identify pathogens, many are elaborate, time-consuming, or technically challenging. For example, traditional microbial culturing techniques can take several days or even weeks for analysis, and are better suited for secondary confirmation. More-rapid technologies that have been successfully developed include fluorescence imaging and other laser-based optic approaches that label and identify pathogenic organisms, e.g., the MicroPro by Advanced Analytical (Ames, IA); spectroscopy- and spectrometry-based systems for detecting biological and chemical agents, e.g., aerosol MALDI mass spectrometry, mobile infrared spectroscopy, and surface-enhanced Raman spectroscopy; and high-density protein microarrays for extensive proteome screening of pathogens, e.g., the ProtoArray by Invitrogen (Carlsbad, CA).
Next-generation immunoassays have made great strides since the days of traditional enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays. While such technologies, including microbead, fiber optic, piezoelectric, amperometric, and nanowire immunosensors are still being developed, they show great promise as applications for rapid, sensitive, high-throughput, and multiplexed pathogen detection.5–8 However, the current cost of equipment and reagents, overall assay complexity, and the need for greater technical expertise may limit first responders’ abilities to use broadly such technologies in biothreat situations.
Real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR)-based technologies, such as immuno-PCR techniques that combine the specificity of immunoassays with the amplification and quantification of real-time PCR, have emerged as a leading technology for rapid pathogen identification due to their speed and high degree of sensitivity and specificity.9–11 However, the drawbacks of PCR have limited its potential as a first-responder technology. Such drawbacks include the high cost of equipment, training, and reagents; the high degree of false positives or negatives, which is a direct result of its ultrasensitivity; and the requirement of having some knowledge of the pathogen subgroup or subtype.
Other drawbacks are the frequent mutation rate that may affect priming sites (e.g., mispriming) and the fact that the DNA or RNA level present is not a direct indicator of function or pathogenicity.
Similarly, PCR-based assays for detecting agents such as dianthin and ricin have been limited to quasipure samples and are unlikely to detect such agents in their purest and most dangerous forms because of the lack of nucleic acids available for detection. Nonetheless, a number of rapid PCR-based systems have become the acceptable standard for assessing biothreat agents, given the need to identify quickly and efficiently their risk rather than their pathogenicity. But directly measuring pathogenicity is limited by the assays’ ability to detect only one biothreat agent or a limited number of agents among many that may harm a population.
Advances in nucleic acid detection chemistries, technologies, and hardware have significantly shortened the analysis time from hours to about 30 minutes. The forefront technologies include handheld devices such as the Razor by Idaho Technologies (Salt Lake City, UT), the Bio-Seeq Plus by Smiths Detection (Edgewood, MD), and the GeneXpert real-time PCR system by Cepheid (Sunnyvale, CA). These PCR systems have been praised for their sensitivity and preformatted all-in-one cartridge or pouch-based systems that can assay a multitude of samples simultaneously.
Figure 1. (click to enlarge) Threat detection turnaround time.
|
Bridging the Gap
The critical step for these biothreat monitoring technologies is integrating the detection and identification processes into a reliable, easy-to-use, and portable system. Such a system should operate as a constant sample collector or detector, and utilize a real-time trigger to prompt the identification system. But for many technologies, liquid-sample handling and complex matrix collection and preparation times have limited any reduction in the detection and identification times. This limitation has led to a greater emphasis on further developing comprehensive aerosol monitoring systems.
In 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security established the BioWatch program. But this program was initially limited by the daily collection of airborne samples on filters that were sent to state and local public health laboratories for analysis.12 While effective, the system was too slow and cumbersome to respond to threats in real-time. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, CA) is developing several next-generation monitoring systems that have made significant advances in reducing the time between detection and identification. Such systems minimize end-user handling of samples and the use of consumables (thereby becoming more cost-effective), and also increase portability.12
For example, the Bioaerosol mass spectrometry system uses laser-induced fluorescence to obtain mass spectral signatures for identifying pathogenic bioaerosols. The Biobriefcase based on the MicroChemLab platform by Sandia National Laboratory (Albuquerque) utilizes microfluidic, chip-based modules for multiplex pathogen detection. ICx Technologies (Albuquerque) is developing the BioXC 200GX system that integrates with the ICx MesoSystems AirSentinel trigger unit, and collects aerosol samples with a Cepheid GeneXpert PCR cartridge. Although the BioXC’s sample-collection and autodispensing features minimize end-user handling, the PCR cartridge must be manually transferred into the GeneXpert analyzer for real-time amplification.
These technologies have improved detection times and achieved greater specificity and sensitivity of pathogen identification. However, they do not meet all of the Detect to Protect time-frame criteria of speed (less than 5 minutes), sensitivity, and specificity. The BioFlash biological aerosol collection and identification system by Innovative Biosensors (Rockville, MD), a next-generation bioaerosol monitoring system, has taken steps to achieve this goal.
BioFlash Detection System
Figure 2. (click to enlarge) CANARY overview.
|
Figure 3. (click to enlarge) Sensitivity of CANARY assay using liquid biowarfare simulant agent.
|
Table I. (click to enlarge) Available CANARY assays.
|
Figure 4. (click to enlarge) BioFlash and Biodisk overview.
|
One obvious concern with live-cell mixtures is maintaining the cells’ functionality during the production phase, under a variety of storage conditions, and throughout the assay period. Once loaded into the BioFlash instrument, each BioDisc remains stable for up to one week at ambient temperature, which is suitable for integration into automated air-handling systems. While the exhausted BioDisc requires replacement after a triggering event initiates aerosol collection and the analysis is complete, the BioDisc is cost-effective and easy to replace. Refrigerating the BioDiscs provides greater long-term storage (about six weeks), and other advances have been made to increase the stability and shelf life of the B cells in the BioDisc.
Table II. (click to enlarge) CANARY assay resistance to interference.
|
Figure 5. (click to enlarge) BioFlash test data..
|
Conclusion
![]() |
Colette A. Côté, PhD,
is a senior scientist at Innovative Biosensors Inc. (Rockville, MD).
She can be reached at ccote@innovative
biosensors.com. |
The advances made by all of the technologies discussed in this article have brought the notion of Detect to Protect much closer to practical realization. Within the next few years, more of these technologies will hopefully transition into readily available low-cost handheld devices, thereby further increasing their value.
References
1. “Foodborne Illness: Frequently Asked Questions,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta: 2005 [cited 22 February 2008]); available from Internet: www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections_g.htm#howmanycases.
2. “Environmental Effects on Human and Wildlife Health,” U.S. Geological Survey (Reston, VA: 1998 [cited 22 February 2008]); available from Internet: www.usgs.gov/themes/FS-189-97/.
3. “Prescription for Harm: The Decline in FDA Enforcement Activity,” U. S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Minority Staff Special Investigations Division (Washington, DC: 2006 [cited 22 February 2008]; available from Internet: http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20060627101434-98349.pdf.
4. “Testing for Rapid Detection of Adulteration of Food,” Department of Health and Human Services and FDA (Rockville, MD: 2003 [cited 22 February 2008]; available from Internet: www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/report_congress.html.
5. NO Fischer et al., “Heightened Sense for Sensing: Recent Advances in Pathogen Immunoassay Sensing Platforms,” The Analyst 132, no. 3 (2007): 187–191.
6. M Taniguchi et al., “A Fiber-Optic Immunosensor for Rapid Bacteria Determination,” poster presentation at the 3rd Kuala Lumpur International Conference on Biomedical Engineering, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, December 2006.
7. M Pohanka and P Skládal, “Piezoelectric Immunosensor for the Direct and Rapid Detection of Francisella tularensis,” Folia Microbiologica 52, no. 4 (2007): 325–330.
8. V Escamilla-Gómez et al., “Development of an Amperometric Immunosensor for the Quantification of Staphylococcus aureus Using Self-Assembled Monolayer-Modified Electrodes as Immobilization Platforms,” Electroanalyst, 19, no. 14 (2007): 1476–1482.
9. K Petersen and W McMillan, “IVD Systems in Bioterrorism Response,” IVD Technology 8, no. 4 (2002): 35–40.
10. C Lubelli et al., “Detection of Ricin and Other Ribosome-Inactivating Proteins by an Immuno-Polymerase Chain Reaction Assay,” Analytical Biochemistry 355, no. 1 (2006): 102–109.
11. H Zhang et al., “Ultrasensitive Assays for Proteins,” The Analyst 132, no. 8 (2006): 724–737.
12. B Howard, “Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Homeland Security Organization,” American Biotechnology Laboratory 24, no. 7 (2006): 18–21.
13. TH Rider et al., “A B Cell-Based Sensor for Rapid Identification of Pathogens,” Science 301, no. 5630 (2003): 213–215.
14. TJ Hazel et al., “Application of a Biosensor for Rapid Detection of E. coli O157:H7 Contamination in Ground Beef,” poster presentation at the 105th Annual American Society for Microbiology Conference, Orlando, FL, May 2005.
15. I Mielzynska and TJ Hazel, “Rapid Detection of Chlamydia trachomatis in Human Urine Using a B Cell-Based Biosensor,” poster presentation at the 39th Annual American Association of Clinical Chemistry Oakridge Conference, St. Louis, April 2007.
16. TJ Hazel et al., “Rapid Detection of Food Pathogens on Stainless Steel Surfaces Using a B Cell-Based Biosensor,” poster presentation at the 107th Annual American Society for Microbiology Conference, Atlanta, June 2007.





